Article 52

Judgment of the Court; 16 June 1981; Peter Klomps v Karl Michel; in Case 166/80:

Article 27, point 2, of the Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters must be interpreted as follows:

1. The words "the document which instituted the proceedings" cover any document, such as the order for payment [Zahlungsbefehl] in German law, service of which enables the plaintiff, under the law of the State of the court in which the judgment was given to obtain, in default of appropriate action taken by the defendant, a decision capable of being recognized and enforced under the provisions of the Convention.

2. A decision such as the enforcement order [Vollstreckungsbefehl] in German law, which is issued after service of the order for payment has been effected and which is enforceable under the Convention, is not covered by the words "the document which instituted the proceedings".

3. In order to determine whether the defendant has been enabled to arrange for his defence as required by Article 27, point 2, the court in which enforcement is sought must take account only of the time, such as that allowed under German law for submitting an objection [Widerspruch] to the order for payment, available to the defendant for the purposes of preventing the issue of a judgment in default which is enforceable under the Convention.

4. Article 27, point 2, remains applicable where the defendant has lodged an objection against the decision given in default and a court of the State in which the judgment was given has held the objection to be inadmissible on the ground that the time for lodging an objection has expired.

5. Even if a court of the State in which the judgment was given has held, in separate adversary proceedings, that service was duly effected Article 27, point 2, still requires the court in which enforcement is sought to examine whether service was effected in sufficient time to enable the defendant to arrange for his defence.

6. The court in which enforcement is sought may as a general rule confine itself to examining whether the period, reckoned from the date on which service was duly effected, allowed the defendant sufficient time for his defence. It must, however, consider whether, in a particular case, there are exceptional circumstances such as the fact that, although service was duly effected, it was inadequate for the purposes of causing that time to begin to run.

7. Article 52 of the Convention and the fact that the court of the State in which enforcement is sought concluded that under the law of that State the defendant was habitually resident within its territory at the date of service of the document which instituted the proceedings do not affect the replies given above.