Case number

C-176/12

Case name

Association de médiation sociale

Document

Judgment ECLI:EU:C:2014:2

Date

15/01/2014

Source of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

Cour de cassation (France)

Name of the parties

Association de médiation sociale v Union locale des syndicats CGT and Others

Subject matter

Social policy - information and consultation with workers; introduction of employee representative bodies in AMS

Key words

Subjecting the setting up of bodies - Representing staff - Certain thresholds of employees - Calculation of the thresholds - National legislation - Contrary to EU law - Role of the national court

Question referred for a preliminary ruling

referred for a preliminary ruling  (1)      May the fundamental right of workers to information and consultation, recognised by Article 27 of the [Charter], and as specified in the provisions of Directive [2002/14], be invoked in a dispute between private individuals in order to assess the compliance [with European Union law] of a national measure implementing the directive?

(2)      In the affirmative, may those same provisions be interpreted as precluding a national legislative provision which excludes from the calculation of staff numbers in the undertaking, in particular to determine the legal thresholds for putting into place bodies representing staff, workers with [assisted] contracts?’

Decision

Article 27 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, by itself or in conjunction with the provisions of Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community, must be interpreted to the effect that, where a national provision implementing that directive, such as Article L. 1111-3 of the French Labour Code, is incompatible with European Union law, that article of the Charter cannot be invoked in a dispute between individuals in order to disapply that national provision.

Case number

C-28/20

Case name

Airhelp

Document

Judgment ECLI:EU:C:2021:226

Date

23/03/2021

Source of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

Attunda tingsrätt (Attunda District Court, Sweden)

Name of the parties

Airhelp Ltd v Scandinavian Airlines System Denmark - Norway - Sweden

Subject matter

Transport; air passenger rights; flight cancellation compensation

Key words

Airhelp - Air transport - Regulation (EC) No 261/2004- Common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of cancellation or long delay of flights - Exemption from the obligation to pay compensation - Concept of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ - Pilots’ strike organised within a legal framework - Circumstances that are ‘internal’ and ‘external’ to the operating air carrier’s activity - Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - No impairment of the air carrier’s freedom to conduct a business, right to property and right of negotiation)

Question referred for a preliminary ruling

‘(1)      Does a strike by airline pilots who are employed by an air carrier and who are needed to carry out a flight constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation No 261/2004, when the strike is not implemented in connection with a measure decided upon or announced by the air carrier but of which notice is given and which is lawfully initiated by workers’ organisations as industrial action intended to induce the air carrier to increase wages, provide benefits or amend employment conditions in order to meet the organisations’ demands?

(2)      What significance, if any, is to be attached to the fairness of the workers’ organisations’ demands and, in particular, to the fact that the wage increase demanded is significantly higher than the wage increases which generally apply to the national labour markets in question?

(3)      What significance, if any, is to be attached to the fact that the air carrier, in order to avoid a strike, accepts a proposal for settlement from a national body responsible for mediating labour disputes but the workers’ organisations do not?’

Decision

Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, must be interpreted as meaning that strike action which is entered into upon a call by a trade union of the staff of an operating air carrier, in compliance with the conditions laid down by national legislation, in particular the notice period imposed by it, which is intended to assert the demands of that carrier’s workers and which is followed by a category of staff essential for operating a flight does not fall within the concept of an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ within the meaning of that provision.

Case number

Case number

Document

Date

Source of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

Name of the parties

Subject matter

Key words

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling

Decision

Case number

Case number

Document

Date

Source of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

Name of the parties

Subject matter

Key words

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling

Decision

Case number

C-518/20

Case name

Fraport

Document

Judgment ECLI:EU:C:2022:707

Date

22/09/2022

Source of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

In Joined Cases C‑518/20 and C‑727/20, Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Labour Court, Germany)

Name of the parties

XP v Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide (C‑518/20) and AR v St. Vincenz-Krankenhaus GmbH (C‑727/20)

Subject matter

Employment and social policy; paid annual leave

Key words

Fraport - Social policy - Protection of the safety and health of workers - Organisation of working time - Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - Directive 2003/88/EC - Right to paid annual leave - Total invalidity or incapacity for work due to illness occurring during a leave year - National legislation providing for the loss of entitlement to paid annual leave on expiry of a certain period - Employer’s obligation to enable the worker to exercise his or her right to paid annual leave

Question referred for a preliminary ruling

‘(1)      Do Article 7 of Directive [2003/88] and Article 31(2) of the [Charter] preclude an interpretation of a rule of national law such as Paragraph 7(3) of the [BUrlG] according to which the as yet unexercised entitlement to paid annual leave of a worker who became ill to an extent that rendered him or her unfit for work in the course of the leave year, but who could still have taken - at least some of - the leave in the leave year before the onset of his or her illness, lapses 15 months after the end of the leave year in the event of a continuing uninterrupted period of incapacity for work even if the employer has not actually enabled the worker to exercise his or her leave entitlement by duly informing him or her of the leave concerned and inviting him or her to take it?

(2)      If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative: Does this also preclude the lapse of entitlement at a later date under these conditions if incapacity for work continues?’

Decision

Article 7 of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time and Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

must be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which the entitlement to paid annual leave, acquired by a worker during the leave year in the course of which that worker actually worked before finding him or herself in a state of total invalidity or incapacity for work due to illness which has persisted since, may lapse, either at the end of a carry-over period authorised under national law, or even at a later stage, where the employer has not, in good time, enabled the worker to exercise that entitlement.

Case number

C-262/20

Case name

Glavna direktsia „Pozharna bezopasnost i zashtita na naselenieto“

Document

Judgment ECLI:EU:C:2022:117

Date

24/02/2022

Source of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

Rayonen sad Lukovit (District Court, Lukovit, Bulgaria)

Name of the parties

VB v Glavna direktsia „Pozharna bezopasnost i zashtita na naselenieto“ kam Ministerstvo na vatreshnite raboti

Subject matter

Employment and social policy; working conditions; calculation and payment of night work hours worked

Key words

VB - Social policy - Organisation of working time -- Reduction - Normal length  - Night work -  Relation -  Day work - Public sector workers -Private sector workers - Equal treatment

Question referred for a preliminary ruling

‘(1)      For the purposes of effective protection under Article 12(a) of Directive [2003/88], should the normal length of night work of police officers and firefighters be shorter than the normal length of day work?

(2)      For the purposes of the principle of equality set out in Articles 20 and 31 of the [Charter], must the normal length of night work laid down in national law for workers in the private sector (7 hours) also apply to public-sector workers, including police officers and firefighters?

(3)      Can the objective of limiting the duration of periods of night work mentioned in recital 8 of Directive [2003/88] be effectively attained only if the normal length of night work, including for public-sector workers, is expressly laid down in national law?’

Decision

1.      Article 8 and Article 12(a) of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time are to be interpreted as not requiring the adoption of national legislation providing that the normal length of night work for public-sector workers, such as police officers and firefighters, must be shorter than the normal length of day work laid down for those workers. Such workers must, in any case, enjoy other protective measures in the form of working time, pay, allowances or similar benefits, such as to compensate for the particular burden entailed by the night work they perform.

2.      Articles 20 and 31 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union are to be interpreted as not precluding the normal length of night work fixed at seven hours in the national law of a Member State for workers in the private sector from not applying to public-sector workers, including police officers and firefighters, if that difference in treatment is based on an objective and reasonable criterion, that is, if the difference relates to a legally permitted aim pursued by that legislation, and it is proportionate to that aim.

Case number

C-658/18

Case name

Governo della Repubblica italiana (Status of Italian justice of the peace)

Document

Judgment ECLI:EU:C:2020:572

Date

16/07/2020

Source of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

Giudice di pace di Bologna (magistrate of Bologna, Italy)

Name of the parties

UX v Governo della Repubblica italiana

Subject matter

Employment and social policy; claim for damages for harm caused by breach of EU law by the Italian State

Key words

UX - definition of ‘court or tribunal of a Member State’ - Criteria - Social policy - Directive 2003/88/EC - Scope - Paid annual leave - Directive 1999/70/EC - Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP - Concept of ‘fixed-term worker’ - Magistrates and ordinary judges - Difference in treatment - Principle of non-discrimination - Concept of ‘objective grounds

Question referred for a preliminary ruling

‘(1)      Does a giudice di pace [magistrate], when making a request for a preliminary ruling, meet the definition of an ordinary European court having jurisdiction to make a request for a preliminary ruling pursuant to Article 267 TFEU, even though - in breach of the guarantees of the independence and impartiality of ordinary European courts referred to by the Court of Justice in its judgments of 19 September 2006, Wilson (C‑506/04, EU:C:2006:587, paragraphs 47 to 53); of 27 February 2018, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (C‑64/16, EU:C:2018:117, paragraphs 32 and 41 to 45); and of 25 July 2018, Minister for Justice and Equality (Deficiencies in the system of justice) (C‑216/18 PPU, EU:C:2018:586, paragraphs 50 to 54) - under national law, magistrates do not, because of their job insecurity, enjoy working conditions equivalent to those of professional judges, even though they perform the same judicial functions and are included in the national judicial system?

(2)      If question 1 is answered in the affirmative, is the work carried out by the applicant giudice di pace [magistrate] covered by the term “fixed-term worker” for the purpose of Article 1(3) and Article 7 of Directive 2003/88, read in conjunction with clause 2 of [the Framework Agreement] and Article 31(2) of [the Charter], as interpreted by the Court of Justice in its judgments of 1 March 2012, O’Brien (C‑393/10, EU:C:2012:110), and of 29 November 2017, King (C‑214/16, EU:C:2017:914) and, if so, may an ordinary or professional judge be regarded as a permanent worker indistinguishable from a giudice di pace [magistrate] working for a fixed term, for the purposes of the application of the same working conditions as referred to in clause 4 of [the Framework Agreement]?

(3)      If questions 1 and 2 are answered in the affirmative, is Article 47 of [the Charter], read in conjunction with Article 267 TFEU, and in the light of the case-law of the [Court] concerning the liability of the Italian State for manifest infringement of [EU] law by courts adjudicating at last instance in the judgments of 30 September 2003, Köbler (C‑224/01, EU:C:2003:513); of 13 June 2006, Traghetti del Mediterraneo (C‑173/03, EU:C:2006:391); and of 24 November 2011, Commission v Italy (C‑379/10, [not published,] EU:C:2011:775), inconsistent with Article 2(3) and (3a) of [legge n. 117 - Risarcimento dei danni cagionati nell’esercizio delle funzioni giudiziarie e responsabilità civile dei magistrate (Law No 117 concerning compensation for damage caused in the exercise of judicial functions and the civil liability of judges) of 13 April 1988] … [(GURI No 88 of 15 April 1988)], which provides for judicial liability for intentional fault or serious misconduct “in the event of manifest infringement of the law or of European Union law” and which presents national courts with the choice - which, however it is made, gives rise to civil liability and liability to disciplinary action in relation to the State in cases in which the public authority itself is a substantive party and in particular where the adjudicator of the case is a giudice di pace [magistrate] working for a fixed term and without effective legal, economic and social security protection as in the present case - of either infringing national legislation, by disapplying it and applying EU law, as interpreted by the Court of Justice, or of infringing EU law and applying national legislation which precludes protection and is incompatible with Article 1(3) and Article 7 of Directive 2003/88, clauses 2 and 4 of [the Framework Agreement] and Article 31(2) of [the Charter]?’

Decision

1.      Article 267 TFEU must be interpreted as meaning that the giudice di pace (magistrate, Italy) falls within the concept of ‘court or tribunal of a Member State’ within the meaning of that article.

2.      Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time and Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be interpreted as meaning that a magistrate who, in the context of his or her duties, performs real and genuine services which are neither purely marginal nor ancillary, and for which he or she receives compensation representing remuneration, may fall within the concept of ‘worker’ within the meaning of those provisions, which it is for the referring court to verify.

Clause 2(1) of the Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded on 18 March 1999, which is annexed to Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP, must be interpreted as meaning that the concept of ‘fixed-term worker’ in that provision may encompass a magistrate appointed for a limited period, who, in the context of his or her duties, performs real and genuine services which are neither purely marginal nor ancillary, and for which he or she receives compensation representing remuneration, which it is for the referring court to verify.

Clause 4(1) of the Framework agreement on fixed-term work concluded on 18 March 1999, which is annexed to Directive 1999/70, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which does not provide for an entitlement on the part of magistrates to 30 days’ paid annual leave, such as that provided for ordinary judges, where those magistrates fall within the concept of ‘fixed-term workers’ within the meaning of clause 2(1) of that framework agreement, and are in a situation comparable to that of ordinary judges, unless such a difference in treatment is justified by the differences in the qualifications required and the nature of the duties undertaken by those judges, which it is for the referring court to verify.

Case number

C-55/18

Case name

CCOO

Document

Judgment ECLI:EU:C:2019:402

Date

14/05/2019

Source of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

Audiencia Nacional (National High Court, Spain))

Name of the parties

Federación de Servicios de Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) v Deutsche Bank SAE

Subject matter

Employment and social policy; organisation of working time

Key words

CCOO - Social policy - Protection of the safety and health of workers - Organisation of working time - Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - Directive 2003/88/EC - Daily and weekly rest - Maximum weekly working time - Directive 89/391/EEC - Safety and health of workers at work - Requirement to set up a system enabling the duration of time worked each day by each worker to be measured

Question referred for a preliminary ruling

‘(1)      Must it be understood that by Articles 34 and 35 of the Workers’ Statute, as they have been interpreted by [Spanish] case-law, the Kingdom of Spain has taken the measures necessary to ensure the effectiveness of the limits to working time and of the weekly and daily rest periods established by Articles 3, 5 and 6 of [Directive 2003/88] for full-time workers who have not expressly agreed, whether individually or collectively, to work overtime and who are not mobile workers or persons working in the merchant navy or railway transport?

(2)      Must Article 31(2) of [the Charter] and Articles 3, 5, 6, 16 and 22 of [Directive 2003/88], read in conjunction with Articles 4(1), 11(3) and 16(3) of [Directive 89/391], be interpreted as precluding internal national legislation such as Articles 34 and 35 of the Workers’ Statute from which, as settled [Spanish] case-law has determined, it cannot be inferred that employers must set up a system for recording actual daily working time [worked] by full-time workers who have not expressly agreed, whether individually or collectively, to work overtime and who are not mobile workers or persons working in the merchant navy or railway transport?

(3)      Must the mandatory requirement laid down in Article 31(2) of [the Charter] and Articles 3, 5, 6, 16 and 22 of [Directive 2003/88], read in conjunction with Articles 4(1), 11(3) and 16(3) of [Directive 89/391] for the Member States to limit the working time of all workers generally, be understood to be satisfied for ordinary workers by the internal national legislation, contained in Articles 34 and 35 of the Workers’ Statute from which, as settled [Spanish] case-law has determined, it cannot be inferred that employers are required to set up a system for recording actual daily working time for full-time workers who have not expressly agreed, whether individually or collectively, to work overtime, unlike mobile workers or persons working in the merchant navy or railway transport?’

Decision

Articles 3, 5 and 6 of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, read in the light of Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and Article 4(1), Article 11(3) and Article 16(3) of Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work, must be interpreted as precluding a law of a Member State that, according to the interpretation given to it in national case-law, does not require employers to set up a system enabling the duration of time worked each day by each worker to be measured.

Case number

C-609/17

Case name

TSN

Document

Judgment ECLI:EU:C:2019:981

Date

19/11/2019

Source of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

Työtuomioistuin (Labour Court, Finland)

Name of the parties

Terveys- ja sosiaalialan neuvottelujärjestö (TSN) ry v Hyvinvointialan liitto ry; Auto- ja Kuljetusalan Työntekijäliitto AKT ry v Satamaoperaattorit ry

Subject matter

Employment and social policy; annual leave

Key words

TSN - Social policy - Minimum safety and health requirements for the organisation of working time - Directive 2003/88/EC -Right to paid annual leave of at least 4 weeks- Provisions of national legislation and collective agreements more favourable to the protection of the safety and health of workers - Workers incapable of working during a period of paid annual leave due to illness - Refusal to carry over that leave where not carrying over that leave does not reduce the actual duration of the paid annual leave below 4 weeks -Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

Question referred for a preliminary ruling

‘(1)      Does Article 7(1) of Directive [2003/88] preclude a national provision in a collective agreement, or its interpretation, under which an employee who was incapacitated for work at the beginning of his annual leave or part thereof is not entitled, irrespective of any application by him, to carry over annual leave falling within the period in question and to which he is entitled under the collective agreement, if the employee’s entitlement to 4 weeks of annual leave is not reduced by reason of the fact that the leave under the collective agreement is not carried over?

(2)      Does Article 31(2) of the [Charter] have direct effect in an employment relationship between private legal subjects, that is to say, horizontal direct effect?

(3)      Does Article 31(2) of the [Charter] protect accrued leave, in so far as the duration of the leave exceeds the minimum annual leave of 4 weeks provided for in Article 7(1) of [Directive 2003/88], and does that provision of the [Charter] preclude a national provision in a collective agreement, or its interpretation, under which an employee who was incapacitated for work at the beginning of his annual leave or part thereof is not entitled, irrespective of any application by him, to carry over annual leave falling within the period in question and to which he is entitled under the collective agreement, if the employee’s entitlement to 4 weeks of annual leave is not reduced by reason of the fact that the leave under the collective agreement is not carried over?’

Decision

1.      Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time must be interpreted as not precluding national rules or collective agreements which provide for the granting of days of paid annual leave which exceed the minimum period of 4 weeks laid down in that provision, and yet exclude the carrying over of those days of leave on the grounds of illness.

2.      Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, read in conjunction with Article 51(1) thereof, must be interpreted as meaning that it is not intended to apply where such national rules or collective agreements exist.

Case number

C-385/17

Case name

Hein

Document

Judgment ECLI:EU:C:2018:1018

Date

13/12/2018

Source of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

Arbeitsgericht Verden (Labour Court, Verden, Germany)

Name of the parties

Torsten Hein v Albert Holzkamm GmbH & Co

Subject matter

Employment and social policy; by calculating salary compensation for vacation time

Key words

Hein - Social policy - Organisation of working time - Right to paid annual leave - Collective agreements - Short-time working - Calculating remuneration - Salary - Temporal effects

Question referred for a preliminary ruling

‘(1)      Are Article 31 of the [Charter] and Article 7(1) of [Directive 2003/88] to be interpreted as precluding national legislation under which it may be provided in collective agreements that reductions in earnings occurring in the period of calculation as a result of short-time work affect the calculation of the payment for annual leave with the result that the worker receives a lower remuneration for annual leave for the duration of the period of annual leave of at least four weeks, or receives a lower allowance in lieu of leave after the employment relationship has ended, than he would receive if the calculation of the remuneration for annual leave were based on the average earnings which the worker would have received in the period of calculation without such reductions in earnings? If so, what is the maximum percentage, with reference to the worker’s full average earnings, that a collectively agreed reduction, permitted by national legislation, of the remuneration for annual leave may have as a result of short-time work in the period of calculation in order for the interpretation of that national legislation to be regarded as in conformity with EU law?

(2)      If Question 1 is answered in the affirmative: Do the general principle of legal certainty laid down by EU law and the principle of non-retroactivity require that the possibility of relying on the interpretation which the Court places, in the preliminary ruling to be given in the present case, on Article 31 of the [Charter] and on Article 7(1) of [Directive 2003/88] be limited in time, with effect for all parties, because the highest national courts have previously ruled that the relevant national legislation and collectively agreed rules are not amenable to an interpretation in conformity with EU law? If the Court answers this question in the negative: Is it compatible with EU law if, on the basis of national law, the national courts grant protection of legitimate expectations to employers who have relied on the continued application of the case-law developed by the highest national courts, or is the grant of protection of legitimate expectations reserved for the Court of Justice of the European Union?’

Decision

1.      Article 7(1) of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time and Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be interpreted as precluding national legislation, such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which, for the purpose of calculating remuneration for annual leave, allows collective agreements to provide for account to be taken of reductions in earnings resulting from the fact that during the reference period there were days when no work was actually performed owing to short-time working, with the consequence that the worker receives, for the duration of the minimum period of annual leave to which he is entitled under Article 7(1) of the directive, remuneration for annual leave that is lower than the normal remuneration which he receives during periods of work. It is for the referring court to interpret the national legislation, so far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of Directive 2003/88, in such a way that the remuneration for annual leave paid to workers in respect of the minimum annual leave provided for in Article 7(1) is not less than the average of the normal remuneration received by those workers during periods of actual work.

2.      It is not appropriate to limit the temporal effects of the present judgment and EU law must be interpreted as precluding national courts from protecting, on the basis of national law, the legitimate expectation of employers that the case-law of the highest national courts, which confirmed the lawfulness of the provisions concerning paid annual leave in the Bundesrahmentarifvertrag für das Baugewerbe (Federal collective framework agreement for the construction industry), will continue to apply.

Case number

C-684/16

Case name

Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften

Document

Judgment ECLI:EU:C:2018:874

Date

06/11/2018

Source of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Labour Court, Germany)

Name of the parties

Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften eV v Tetsujiju Shimizuju

Subject matter

Employment and social policy; financial compensation for paid annual leave not taken before termination of employment

Key words

Shimizu  - Organisation of working time - Directive 2003/88/EC- Right to paid annual leave - National legislation providing for the loss of annual leave not taken and of the allowance in lieu thereof where an application for leave has not been made by the worker prior to the termination of the employment relationship - Directive 2003/88/EC- Obligation to interpret national law in conformity with EU law - Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - Whether it may be relied upon in a dispute between individuals

Question referred for a preliminary ruling

‘(1)      Does Article 7(1) of Directive [2003/88] or Article 31(2) of the [Charter] preclude national legislation, such as Paragraph 7 of the [BUrlG], under which, as one of the methods of exercising the right to annual leave, an employee must apply for such leave with an indication of his preferred dates so that the leave entitlement does not lapse at the end of the relevant period without compensation and under which an employer is not required, unilaterally and with binding effect for the employee, to specify when that leave be taken by the employee within the relevant period?

(2)      If the first question referred is answered in the affirmative:

Does this apply even where the employment relationship is between two private persons?’

Decision

1.      Article 7 of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time and of Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union must be interpreted as precluding national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which, in the event that the worker did not ask to exercise his right to paid annual leave during the reference period concerned, that worker loses, at the end of that period - automatically and without prior verification of whether the employer had in fact enabled him to exercise that right, in particular through the provision of sufficient information - the days of paid annual leave acquired under those provisions in respect of that period, and, accordingly, his right to an allowance in lieu of paid annual leave not taken in the event that the employment relationship is terminated. It is, in that regard, for the referring court to determine, taking into consideration the whole body of domestic law and applying the interpretative methods recognised by it, whether it can arrive at an interpretation of that right capable of ensuring the full effectiveness of EU law.

2.      In the event that it is impossible to interpret national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings in a manner consistent with Article 7 of Directive 2003/88 and Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, it follows from the latter provision that a national court hearing a dispute between a worker and his former employer who is a private individual must disapply the national legislation and ensure that, should the employer not be able to show that it has exercised all due diligence in enabling the worker actually to take the paid annual leave to which he is entitled under EU law, the worker cannot be deprived of his acquired rights to that paid annual leave or, correspondingly, and in the event of the termination of the employment relationship, to the allowance in lieu of leave not taken which must be paid, in that case, directly by the employer concerned.

Case number

C-569/16

Case name

Bauer

Document

Judgment ECLI:EU:C:2018:871

Date

06/11/2018

Source of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Labour Court, Germany)

Name of the parties

Stadt Wuppertal v Marii Elisabeth Bauer;Volker Willmeroth v Martini Broßonn

Subject matter

Employment and social policy; payment of compensation for untaken annual leave

Key words

Bauer - Organisation of working time - Directive 2003/88/EC  - Right to paid annual leave - Employment relationship terminated by the death of the worker - National legislation preventing the payment of an allowance to the legal heirs of a worker in lieu of paid annual leave not taken by him - Obligation to interpret national law in conformity with EU law - Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - Whether it may be relied upon in a dispute between individuals

Question referred for a preliminary ruling

‘(1)      Does Article 7 of Directive [2003/88] or Article 31(2) of the [Charter] grant the heir of a worker who died while in an employment relationship a right to financial compensation for the worker’s minimum annual leave prior to his death, which is precluded by Paragraph 7(4) of the [BUrlG], read in conjunction with Paragraph 1922(1) of the [BGB]?

(2)      If the first question is answered in the affirmative: Does this also apply where the employment relationship is between two private persons?’

Decision

1.      Article 7 of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time and of Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as precluding national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings, under which, where the employment relationship is terminated by the death of the worker, the right to paid annual leave acquired under those provisions and not taken by the worker before his death lapses without being able to give rise to a right to an allowance in lieu of that leave which is transferable to the employee’s legal heirs by inheritance.

2.      Where it is impossible to interpret a national rule such as that at issue in the main proceedings in a manner consistent with Article 7 of Directive 2003/88 and Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the national court, before which a dispute between the legal heir of a deceased worker and the former employer of that worker has been brought, must disapply that national legislation and ensure that the legal heir receives payment from the employer of an allowance in lieu of paid annual leave acquired under those provisions and not taken by the worker before his death. That obligation on the national court is dictated by Article 7 of Directive 2003/88 and Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights where the dispute is between the legal heir and an employer which has the status of a public authority, and under the second of those provisions where the dispute is between the legal heir and an employer who is a private individual.

Case number

C-316/13

Case name

Fenoll

Document

Judgment ECLI:EU:C:2015:200

Date

26/03/2015

Source of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

Cour de cassation (France)

Name of the parties

Gérard Fenoll v Centre d'aide par le travail „La Jouvene“ and Association de parents et d'amis de personnes handicapées mentales (APEI)

Subject matter

Employment and social policy; financial compensation for untaken annual leave

Key words

Fenoll - Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union- Directive 2003/88/EC -Concept of a ‘worker’ - Person with disabilities - Right to paid annual leave - National legislation contrary to EU law - Role of the national court

Question referred for a preliminary ruling

‘(1)      Must Article 3 of Directive 89/391/EEC, to which Article 1 of Directive 2003/88/EC of 4 November 2003, determining the scope thereof, refers, be interpreted as meaning that a person placed in a work rehabilitation centre can be classified as a “worker” within the meaning of that article?

(2)      Must Article 31 of the Charter be interpreted as meaning that such a person as described in the previous question can be classified as a “worker” within the meaning of Article 31?

(3)      May such a person as described in the first question rely directly upon the rights conferred on him by the Charter in order to obtain an entitlement to paid leave if national legislation does not provide for any such entitlement, and must the national courts, in order to ensure that those rights are fully effective, set aside any contrary provision of national law?’

Decision

The term ‘worker’ within the meaning of Article 7 of Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, and of Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as meaning that it may include a person admitted to a work rehabilitation centre, such as that in the main proceedings.

Case number

C-579/12 RX-II

Case name

Réexamen Commission v Strack

Document

Judgment ECLI:EU:C:2013:570

Date

19/09/2013

Source of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

European Commission- Review of the judgment of the General Court of the European Union T‑268/11 P

Name of the parties

European Commission v Guidu Stracku

Subject matter

Employment and social policy; Staff Regulations applicable to officials and Conditions of employment of other servants; limitation of carry-over of untaken annual leave

Key words

Strack - Civil service - Commission decision refusing to carry over paid annual leave not taken by an official during the reference period because of long term sick leave -Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union -- Directive 2003/88/EC -Right to paid annual leave - Principle of the social law of the European Union -Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - Effect on the unity and consistency of European Union law

Question referred for a preliminary ruling

1        The purpose of these proceedings is to review the judgment of the General Court of the European Union (Appeal Chamber) of 8 November 2012 in Case T‑268/11 P Commission v Strack [2012] ECR (‘the judgment of 8 November 2012’), by which the General Court set aside the judgment of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal of 15 March 2011 in Case F‑120/07 Strack v Commission [2011] ECR-SC I-A-1-0000 and II-A-1-0000, which annulled the decision of the Commission of 15 March 2007 limiting to 12 the number of days of unused annual leave for 2004 which Mr Strack was allowed to carry over (‘the contested decision’).

2        The review concerns the questions whether - having regard to the case-law of the Court of Justice relating to the entitlement to paid annual leave as a principle of European Union social law, which is also expressly affirmed in Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’) and is referred to in particular by Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time (OJ 2003 L 299, p. 9) - the judgment of the General Court of the European Union of 8 November 2012 adversely affects the unity or consistency of European Union law inasmuch as the General Court, as an appeal court:

-        interpreted Article 1e(2) of the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Union to the effect that it does not include the requirements relating to the organisation of working time contained in Directive 2003/88, in particular, paid annual leave, and

-        consequently, interpreted Article 4 of Annex V to those Regulations as implying that the right to carry over annual leave exceeding the limit laid down in that provision may be granted only where the official has been unable to take leave for reasons connected with his activity as an official and the duties he has thus been required to perform.

Decision

1.      Declares that the judgment of the General Court of the European Union (Appeal Chamber) of 8 November 2012 in Case T‑268/11 P Commission v Strack adversely affects the unity and consistency of European Union law inasmuch as the General Court, as an appeal court, disregarding the right to paid annual leave as a principle of the social law of the European Union also expressly affirmed by Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and, in particular, referred to by Directive 2003/88/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time, as interpreted by the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union:

-        interpreted Article 1e(2) of the Staff Regulations to the effect that it does not include the requirements relating to the organisation of working time contained in Directive 2003/88, in particular, paid annual leave, and

-        consequently, interpreted Article 4 of Annex V to those regulations as implying that the right to carry over annual leave exceeding the limit laid down in that provision may be granted only where the official has been unable to take leave for reasons connected with his activity as an official and the duties he has thus been required to perform.

2.      Sets aside that judgment of the General Court of the European Union.

3.      Dismisses the appeal brought by the European Commission against the judgment of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal of 15 March 2011 in Case F‑120/07 Strack v Commission.

4.      Orders the European Commission to pay the costs which Mr Strack incurred both in the review proceedings and in the proceedings before the General Court of the European Union.

5.      Declares that the Council of the European Union and the European Commission shall bear their own costs incurred in the review proceedings.

6.      Declares that the European Commission shall bear its own costs incurred in the proceedings before the General Court of the European Union.

Case number

Case number

Document

Date

Source of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

Name of the parties

Subject matter

Key words

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling

Decision

Case number

Case number

Document

Date

Source of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

Name of the parties

Subject matter

Key words

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling

Decision

Case number

C-350/20

Case name

INPS

Document

Judgment ECLI:EU:C:2021:659

Date

02/09/2021

Source of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

Corte costituzionale (Constitutional Court, Italy)

Name of the parties

O. D. and Others v Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS)

Subject matter

Employment and social policy; denied the right to an allowance upon the birth of a child and to a maternity allowance

Key words

INPS - Rights -  Third-country workers - Single permits -  Right to equal treatment - Social security - Regulation (EC) - Maternity and paternity benefits - Family benefits - Entitlement - Childbirth allowance - Maternity allowance

Question referred for a preliminary ruling

‘Is Article 34 of the [Charter] to be interpreted as applying to childbirth and maternity allowances under Article 3(1)(b) and (j) of Regulation [No 883/2004], referred to in Article 12(1)(e) of Directive [2011/98], and is EU law therefore to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which fails to extend the abovementioned benefits, which are already granted to foreign nationals holding a long-term resident’s EU residence permit, to foreign nationals who hold a single permit under that directive?’

Decision

Article 12(1)(e) of Directive 2011/98/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which excludes the third-country nationals referred to in Article 3(1)(b) and (c) of that directive from entitlement to a childbirth allowance and a maternity allowance provided for by that legislation.

Case number

C-160/20

Case name

Stichting Rookpreventie Jeugd and Others

Document

Judgment ECLI:EU:C:2022:101

Date

22/02/2022

Source of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

Rechtbank Rotterdam (Court in Rotterdam, Netherlands)

Name of the parties

Stichting Rookpreventie Jeugd and Others v Staatssecretaris van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport

Subject matter

Approximation of laws; Environment; Public health

Key words

Stichting Rookpreventie Jeugd - Manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products - Products not complying with the maximum emission levels - Prohibition on placing on the market - Measurement method - Filter cigarettes with small ventilation holes - Measurement of the emissions on the basis of ISO standards - Standards not published in the Official Journal of the European Union - Compliance with the publication requirements laid down in Article 297(1) TFEU read in the light of the principle of legal certainty - Compliance with the principle of transparency

Question referred for a preliminary ruling

‘(1)      Is the form of the measurement method provided for in Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/40, based on ISO standards which are not freely accessible, in accordance with Article 297(1) TFEU (and Regulation (EU) No 216/2013) and with the underlying principle of transparency?

(2)      Must the ISO standards 4387, 10315, 8454 and 8243 referred to by Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/40 be interpreted and applied in such a way that, in the interpretation and application of Article 4(1) of that directive, emissions of tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide should not be measured (and verified) only by the prescribed method, but that those emissions may or must also be measured (and verified) in a different manner and with a different intensity?

(3)      (a)      Is Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/40 contrary to the underlying principles of that directive and to Article 4(2) thereof as well as to Article 5(3) of the [FCTC], given that the tobacco industry played a role in determining the ISO standards referred to in Article 4(1) of that directive?

(b)      Is Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/40 contrary to the underlying principles of that directive, to Article 114(3) TFEU, to the spirit of the [FCTC] and to Articles 24 and 35 of the Charter, on the ground that the measurement method prescribed therein does not measure the emissions from filter cigarettes during their intended use since, with that method, no account is taken of the effect of the small ventilation holes in the filter which are largely closed off during their intended use by the smoker’s lips and fingers?

(4)      (a)      Which alternative measurement method (and verification method) may or must be used should the Court of Justice:

-        answer Question 1 in the negative;

-        answer Question 2 in the affirmative;

-        answer Question 3(a) and/or Question 3(b) in the affirmative?

(b)      If the Court is unable to give an answer to Question 4(a): Does the temporary unavailability of a measurement method give rise to a situation such as that referred to in Article 24(3) of Directive 2014/40?’

Decision

1.      Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/40/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco and related products and repealing Directive 2001/37/EC is to be interpreted as providing that the maximum emission levels for tar, nicotine and carbon monoxide from cigarettes intended to be placed on the market or manufactured in the Member States, prescribed in Article 3(1) of that directive, must be measured in accordance with the measurement methods arising from ISO standards 4387, 10315, 8454 and 8243, to which Article 4(1) refers. 2.      Consideration of Question 1 has disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/40 having regard to the principle of transparency, to Council Regulation (EU) No 216/2013 of 7 March 2013 on the electronic publication of the Official Journal of the European Union, and to Article 297(1) TFEU read in the light of the principle of legal certainty. 3.      Consideration of Question 3(a) has disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/40 having regard to Article 5(3) of the World Health Organisation Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. 4.      Consideration of Question 3(b) has disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/40 having regard to Article 114(3) TFEU, the World Health Organisation Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and Articles 24 and 35 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 5.      Should Article 4(1) of Directive 2014/40 not be binding on individuals, the method used for the purpose of applying Article 3(1) of that directive must be appropriate, in the light of scientific and technical developments or internationally agreed standards, for measuring the levels of emissions released when a cigarette is consumed as intended, and must take as a base a high level of protection of human health, especially for young people, while the accuracy of the measurements obtained by means of that method must be verified by laboratories approved and monitored by the competent authorities of the Member States as referred to in Article 4(2) of that directive.

Case number

Case number

Document

Date

Source of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

Name of the parties

Subject matter

Key words

Questions referred for a preliminary ruling

Decision

Case number

C-444/15

Case name

Associazione Italia Nostra Onlus

Document

Judgment ECLI:EU:C:2016:978

Date

21/12/2016

Source of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

Tribunale amministrativo regionale per il Veneto (Regional Administrative Court for Veneto, Italy)

Name of the parties

Associazione Italia Nostra Onlus v Comune di Venezia and Others

Subject matter

Environment; environmental assessment in the case of the construction of a real estate project

Key words

Associazione - Environment - Directive 2001/42/EC - Assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment - Plans and programmes which require an environmental assessment only where the Member States determine that they are likely to have significant environmental effects - Validity in the light of the TFEU and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union - Meaning of use of ‘small areas at local level’ - National legislation referring to the size of the areas concerned

Question referred for a preliminary ruling

‘(1)      Is Article 3(3) of Directive 2001/42, in so far as it also concerns the situation referred to in Article 3(2)(b), valid, in the light of the environmental rules laid down in the TFEU and in the Charter, to the extent that it removes the systematic requirement to perform a Strategic Environmental Assessment in respect of plans and programmes which were deemed to require an implications assessment pursuant to Articles 6 and 7 of the Habitats Directive?

(2)      Must Article 3(2) and (3) of Directive 2001/42, read in conjunction with recital 10 of that directive, which states that “all plans and programmes which have been determined to require assessment pursuant to [the Habitats Directive] are likely to have significant effects on the environment, and should as a rule be made subject to systematic environmental assessment”, be interpreted as precluding legislation, such as the national legislation in question, which, in defining ‘small areas at local level’ in Article 3(3) of Directive 2001/42, only refers to quantitative criteria?

(3)      Must Article 3(2) and (3) of Directive 2001/42/EC, read in conjunction with recital 10 of that Directive, which states that “all plans and programmes which have been determined to require assessment pursuant to [the Habitats Directive] are likely to have significant effects on the environment, and should as a rule be made subject to systematic environmental assessment”, be interpreted as precluding legislation, such as the national legislation in question, which removes the automatic and compulsory requirement for all new and expansion-related development projects in urban areas covering up to forty hectares or urban-area regeneration or development projects in existing urban areas covering up to ten hectares to undergo the Strategic Environmental Assessment procedure, even where, in view of the potential effects on the sites, they had formerly been deemed to require an implications assessment pursuant to Articles 6 and 7 of [the Habitats Directive]?’

Decision

1.      The examination of the first question referred has disclosed no factor of such a kind as to affect the validity of Article 3(3) of Directive 2001/42/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 June 2001 on the assessment of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment, in the light of the provisions of the TFEU and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.

2.      Article 3(3) of Directive 2001/42, read in conjunction with recital 10 of that directive, must be interpreted to the effect that the term ‘small areas at local level’ in paragraph 3 must be defined with reference to the size of the area concerned where the following conditions are fulfilled:

-        the plan or programme is prepared and/or adopted by a local authority, as opposed to a regional or national authority, and

-        that area inside the territorial jurisdiction of the local authority is small in size relative to that territorial jurisdiction.

Case number

C-453/18

Case name

Bondora

Document

Judgment ECLI:EU:C:2019:1118

Date

19/12/2019

Source of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

Juzgado de Primera Instancia No 11 de Vigo (Court of First Instance No 11, Vigo, Spain) and by the Juzgado de Primera Instancia No 20 de Barcelona (Court of First Instance No 20, Barcelona, Spain(In Joined Cases C‑453/18 and C‑494/18)

Name of the parties

Bondora AS v Carlosu V. C. and XY

Subject matter

Consumer protection - Area of freedom, security and justice; judicial cooperation in civil matters; collection of claims from loan agreements; European payment order

Key words

Bondora - Judicial cooperation -  Civil matters - European order -  Payment procedure -Provision - Additional documents to support the claim - Unfair terms  - Consumer contracts -  Review -  Court seised

Question referred for a preliminary ruling

C-453/15

‘(1)      Is Article 7(1) of [Directive 93/13] and the case-law interpreting that directive, to be construed as meaning that that article of the directive precludes a national provision, like the 23rd final provision of [the LEC], which provides that it is not necessary to submit documents with the application for a European order for payment and that, where documents are submitted, they will be ruled inadmissible?

(2)      Is Article 7(2)(e) of [Regulation No 1896/2006] to be construed as meaning that that provision does not preclude a creditor institution from being required to submit documents substantiating its claim based on a consumer loan entered into between a seller or a supplier and a consumer, where the court considers it essential to examine the documents in order to determine whether there are unfair terms in the contract between the parties, thereby complying with the provisions of [Directive 93/13] and the case-law interpreting that directive?’

C-494/18

‘(1)      Is national legislation such as paragraph [2] of the 23rd final provision of the LEC, which does not permit a contract or an itemisation of the debt to be provided or required in a claim in which the defendant is a consumer and where there is evidence that the sums being claimed could be based on unfair terms, compatible with Article 38 of the Charter, Article 6(1) [TEU] and Articles 6(1) and 7(1) of Directive [93/13]?

(2)      Is it compatible with Article 7(2)(d) of Regulation [No 1896/2006] to require the applicant, in a claim against a consumer, to specify the itemisation of the debt he is claiming in Section 11 of standard form A [in Annex 1 to Regulation No 1896/2006]? Is it also compatible with that provision to require that the content of the contractual terms on the basis of which the applicant is making a claim against a consumer, beyond the principal subject matter of the contract, be reproduced in Section 11 in order to assess whether they are unfair?

(3)      If the answer to the second question is negative, is it permissible, under the current wording of Regulation No 1896/2006, to ascertain ex officio, prior to the issue of a European payment order, whether an agreement with a consumer contains unfair terms and if so, on what legal basis may that assessment be carried out?

(4)      In the event that it is not possible to ascertain ex officio, under the current wording of Regulation No 1896/2006, the existence of unfair terms prior to issuing a European payment order, the Court of Justice is requested to rule on the validity of that regulation in the light of Article 38 of the Charter and Article 6(1) [TEU].’

Decision

Article 7(2)(d) and (e) of Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a European order for payment procedure and Article 6(1) and Article 7(1) of Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, as interpreted by the Court and read in the light of Article 38 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as allowing a ‘court’, within the meaning of that regulation, seised in the context of a European order for payment procedure, to request from the creditor additional information relating to the terms of the agreement relied on in support of the claim at issue, in order to carry out an ex officio review of the possible unfairness of those terms and, consequently, that they preclude national legislation which declares the additional documents provided for that purpose to be inadmissible.

Case number

C-470/12

Case name

Pohotovos

Document

Judgment ECLI:EU:C:2014:101

Date

27/02/2014

Source of the question referred for a preliminary ruling

Okresný súd Svidník (Slovakia)

Name of the parties

Pohotovosť s. r. o. v Miroslavu Vašuti

Subject matter

Consumer protection; repayment in connection with a consumer credit agreement

Key words

Pohotovost - Consumer protection - Consumer credit contract - Unfair terms - Directive 93/13/EEC - Enforcement of an arbitration award - Application for leave to intervene in enforcement proceedings - Consumer protection association - National legislation which does not allow such an intervention - Procedural autonomy of the Member States

Question referred for a preliminary ruling

‘1.      Are Articles 6(1), 7(1) and 8 of Directive 93/13 ..., in conjunction with Articles 38 and 47 of the Charter …, to be interpreted as precluding national legislation such as Paragraph 37(1) and (3) of the Enforcement Code, which does not allow a consumer protection association to intervene in enforcement proceedings?

2.      If the answer to the first question is that that legislation does not conflict with [European Union] law, is Paragraph 37(1) and (3) of the Enforcement Code to be interpreted as not precluding a national court from granting a consumer protection association leave to intervene in enforcement proceedings in accordance with Articles 6(1), 7(1) and 8 [of that directive]?’

Decision

Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, in particular Articles 6(1), 7(1) and 8 of that directive, read in conjunction with Articles 38 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation which does not allow a consumer protection association to intervene in support of a consumer in proceedings for enforcement, against the latter, of a final arbitration award.